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Bank Merger Policy and the
Third National Bank Decision
Benjamin J. Klebaner*
Barely two years after enactment of the Bank Merger Act of
1966, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of that law's
substantive provisions for the first time. On March 4, 1968, the Court
demonstrated once again an antimerger stance which has been much
in evidence since Brown Shoe.' Misgivings such as those expressed in
1966 by Representative Charles Weltner of Georgia that this was
"legislation diluting the antitrust laws to a substantial degree"2 have
not been confirmed, at least not by the decision in United States v.
Third National Bank
I. THE NASHVILLE BANKING MARKET
A. Concentration: Local and Comparative
As measured by regional standards, banking in Tennessee's
capital for years centered around three very large institutions and one
of middle size. The latter, Nashville Bank and Trust Company
(hereinafter Nashville Bank), merged into Third National Bank (the
second largest bank in the area) in August, 1964, after the Justice
Department failed to secure a preliminary injunction blocking the
merger.4 This left Davidson County (the county in which Nashville is
located) with seven banks, four of which were quite small. Nashville
Bank was less than one-fourth the size of third-ranking Commerce
Union Bank, but almost seven times as large as the fifth-ranking
bank. As the second largest state-regulated bank in Tennessee,
Nashville Bank was an institution of substantial size. The two largest
banks in Davidson County in the decade preceding the litigated
merger had over 70 per cent of both the resources and demand
deposits owned by individuals, partnerships and corporations, while
the top three banks had over 90 per cent of the assets and demand
*Associate Professor of Economics, The City College of New York.
I. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1966).
3. 390 U.S. 171 (1968), rev'g 260 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
4. 260 F. Supp. at 871.
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deposits of the Davidson County market.
According to the Justice Department's complaint in the case,
banking in the Nashville area was heavily concentrated; but
defendants countered that concentration was not high when compared
to other cities. The district court, looking at comparable southeastern
markets competitive with Nashville, agreed with defendants; and
figures for these metropolitan areas in November, 1964, soon after the
merger, supported this position When the two largest banks in pre-
merger Nashville as of mid-1962 are compared with other
metropolitan areas, Nashville again is similar to the entire Southeast.'
However, Nashville was markedly above the concentration ratio
of similar metropolitan areas throughout the United States in 1962.
Likewise, post-merger Nashville's 95.7 per cent share of demand
deposits in the top three banks surpasses the United States average of
76 per cent for all 60 limited branching metropolitan areas with a
similar total population, placing Nashville clearly among the most
concentrated commercial banking marketsY Indeed, in November,
1964, its three largest banks, with their combined 95.8 per cent share
5. Id. at 882. The average concentration of demand deposits for all 60 Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) in Nashville's population bracket in limited branch
bank states was 80.5% of all deposits in the largest three banks on November 18, 1964, while
Nashville had a concentration of 95.7% in its three largest banks. J. GuTrINTAG & L. HI R\IAN.
BANKING STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 48 (1967). For comparative figures of demand deposit
concentration between Nashville and other southeastern cities, see FDIC, ACCOUNTS AND
DEPOSITS OF INSURED COMMERCIAL BANKS AS OF NOVEMBER 18, 1964; Smith, Measures oj
Banking Structure and Competition, 51 FED. RES. BULL. 1217-18 (1965).
6. For a comparison of the Nashville area with other SMSA's as to concentration ol
deposits in the largest and two largest banks, see Shull & Horvitz, Branch Banking and the
Structure of Competition, in STUDIES IN BANKING COMPETITION AND THE BANKING STRUCTURE
130-33 (1966); 49 FED. RES. BULL. 1321 (1963). For the seven comparable southeastern
SMSA's, the mean deposit concentration for the two largest banks in mid-1962 was 85.31(,
well above the Nahville concentration. Board of Governors, Banking Market Unit,
Concentration of Commercial Bank Deposits in Largest Banks or Bank Groups in Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, (June 30, 1962). Similarly, after the merger, on November 18,
1964, Nashville's 75.1% of demand deposits in the two largest banks compares with an average
of 82.9% for all seven SMSA's. FDIC, ACCOUNTS AND DEPOSITS OF INSURED COMMERCIAL
BANKS (1964).
7. If concentration in all metropolitan areas with limited branch banking is taken, the
median of 78% contrasts with Nashville's 89.4% (mid-1960) and 92.6% (mid-1964) in the three
largest banks. Before the merger, only five areas had a higher ratio than Nashville. Mechanical
addition of Nashville Bank's share brought Nashville's ratio to 97.9%, a greater concentration
than in any of the 64 other principal metropolitan areas in the nation. Plaintiff's exhibit No.
575, United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) [hereinafter cited
as Plaintiff's Exhibit]. See 1962 FDIC ANN. REP. 55, 56.
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of total deposits, had the third highest concentration ratio of all 62
largest metropolitan areas in states permitting branching; only
Birmingham and Bridgeport exceeded Nashville's ratio.'
The district court found there was no trend toward concentration
in the Nashville market.' In mid-1955 the share of the three largest
banks was 94.6 per cent of total assets; nine years later, just before
Nashville Bank disappeared, it was 93.1 per cent. Just after the
merger, on October 1, 1964, the asset share was 97.8 per cent. Over a
span of a quarter of a century, from 1939 to 1964, the asset share of
the two largest Nashville banks increased from 68.8 per cent to 77.5
per cent, and the three largest went from 90.8 per cent to 98.0 per
cent. 0 This growth essentially resulted from successful internal
expansion; Davidson County had few mergers."
B. Geographic Market
The Justice Department's complaint defined the relevant
geographic market as being Metropolitan Nashville, which was then
co-extensive with Davidson County, and also made reference to the
seven surrounding counties. Third National included the eight counties
in the community to be served, in which the three largest Nashville
banks had more than 82 per cent of total deposits at the end of 1963,
compared with 93 per cent of deposits in Davidson County' 2 The
decision of Comptroller of the Currency Saxon approving the merger
used the eight counties and, alternatively, a region with a 250-mile
radius where banks doing correspondent business with Third National
were located, as well as a wholesale trade area extending over middle
8. See FDIC, supra note 6.
9. 260 F. Supp. at 883.
10. POLKS BANKERS ENCYCLOPEDIA 1835-37 (March, 1940); Transcript of Record, vol. 4,
at 1352, United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Transcript]. Between 1939 and 1959, asset concentration in 25 of 46 metropolitan areas which
contain Federal Reserve Bank cities declined substantially. Carson & Cootner, Structure of
Competition in Commercial Banking in the United States, in PRIVATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
80 (1963).
II. The district court's finding that Davidson County had no history of mergers was only
slightly inaccurate. 260 F. Supp. at 883. Broadway National Bank was consolidated with
Commerce Union in mid-1962. This was a change in form rather than substance, as both banks
had been under common ownership and management for almost three decades. In 1952, First
American acquired the out-of-town Madison Bank and Trust- Company. Also, Nashville Bank
absorbed a department of First American in 1933, in a step related to the exigencies of the
Great Depression.
12. Transcript, vol. 1, at 3.
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Tennessee, southern Kentucky, northern Mississippi and northern
Alabama. 3
Rejecting the broader areas, the district court considered
Davidson County exclusively as the relevant geographic market. The
Supreme Court agreed, stating that the 1966 Act had not altered the
traditional antitrust concept of relevant geographic market." Since
Tennessee law confines branching to a single county,'5 the Nashville
banks were limited to opening new offices only in Davidson County.
An examination of the location of depositors confirms the district
court's judgment. Thus 72 per cent of Third National's and 90 per
cent of Nashville Bank's demand deposits (IPC) by value came from
the county; in the case of savings accounts, the respective percentages
were 83 and 90.16
C. Product Market
Also at issue in the case was the nature of the product market.
Comptroller Saxon's opinion singled out savings and loan associations
as particularly strong competitors in the area. By including these in
the product market-as well as loan companies, sales finance
companies, and insurance companies-the Office of the Comptroller
argued that the merger increased Third National's market share by
only two per cent." However, the line of commerce was defined in
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank as "the cluster of
products . . .and services" offered by commercial banks. 8 This
definition was followed by the district court 9 and affirmed on
appeal2
D. Competitive Impact of the Merger
In the historic Philadelphia situation, the merger would have
produced "a firm controlling an undue percentage of the relevant
market," at least 30 per cent of commercial banking in a four-county
area, and would have resulted "in a significant increase [one-third] in
13. 102 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. 129-30 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
COMPTROLLER'S DECISION].
14. 390 U.S. at 182 n.15.
15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-211 (1964).
16. Transcript, vol. 1, at 79.
17. See COMPTROLLER'S DECISION, supra note 13, at 131.
18. 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963).
19. 260 F. Supp. at 878.
20. 390 U.S. at 182 n.15.
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the concentration of [the top two] firms in that market . . . ." The
Supreme Court pronounced such a merger "inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially ...... 1 In addition, there was "a trend
toward concentration" related to "a strong trend toward mergers."
During the 1950's the seven largest banks increased their share of
total assets in the Philadelphia area from 61 to 90 per cent. 2
By contrast in Nashville, as the district court pointed out, the
increase in concentration in the top two banks was about seven
per cent following the merger, and Davidson County had no significant
merger history. In the framework of the Philadelphia criteria, the only
unfavorable factor was Third National's share of almost 40 per cent
of the Nashville banking business. However, by the end of 1965 Third
National had fallen back to second place, whereas Philadelphia
National would have been by far the largest bank in its trade area.23
In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court had warned that "remaining
vigor cannot immunize a merger if the trend in that industry is
toward oligopoly."24 Even before the merger, the Nashville banking
industry was oligopolistic; indeed it had never been anything else. A
trend toward concentration, "whatever its causes," was "a highly
relevant factor in deciding how substantial the anticompetitive effect
of a merger may be," the Supreme Court stated in Pabst.25 No such
trend was discernible in Davidson County; rather, even prior to the
merger, the market was one of heavy concentration.
The Government argued before the Supreme Court that the
Nashville merger eliminated the most probable source of some
possibility of deconcentration. Although preservation of the possibility
of eventual deconcentration in a market setting of already great
concentration was first mentioned in the Philadelphia decision, 6 the
district court viewed the 1966 Act as calling for the approval of a
bank merger under certain circumstances despite this consideration 7
Not dealing explicitly with this issue, the Supreme Court found that
the tendency of the merger to lessen competition substantially was
apparent. The Supreme Court noted that "the share of the three
largest banks went from 93 to 98 per cent with Third National having
21. 374 U.S. at 363-64.
22. Id. at 331.
23. 260 F. Supp. at 879.
24. 370 U.S. at 333.
25. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
26. 374 U.S. at 365 n.42.
27. 260 F. Supp. at 875.
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almost a 40 per cent share." Nashville Bank was deemed to have been
"an important competitive element in certain . . facets of Nashville
banking;" its business had increased steadily, in absolute amount,
since 1956.28 Since Philadelphia provided that a merger "inherently
likely to lessen competition substantially . . . must be enjoined in the
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to
have such anticompetitive effects,""8 an examination of market
behavior in Nashville, as revealed in the proceedings, is therefore
appropriate.
II. BANKING COMPETITION IN NASHVILLE
The market shares of the merging banks are often considered
to be the most reliable indicator of a merger's probable competitive
impact 3 Unquestionably, however, as the district court stated, "no
reliable extrapolation as to future prospects may safely be predicated
upon concentration or market share figures alone." To the district
court, the record refuted predictions of "actual or probable future
oligopolistic behavior." Instead, Judge Miller, the district court judge,
found Davidson County banking to be "highly competitive at all
levels;" indeed, "one of the most highly competitive in the nation." ,
A. Evidence of Competition
The only objective evidence submitted on the issue of competition
dealt with service charges for checking accounts and trust fees. For
example, in the spring of 1966 the three largest Nashville banks had
the lowest average service charges on business demand deposits, with
an average balance of 2,025 dollars, of 49 sizeable banks in 21
southern cities (one half the charge in Richmond, and less than two-
thirds the charge in Atlanta and New Orleans). On both small (225
dollar average balance) and medium-size (625 dollar average balance)
personal checking accounts, only 5 of the 21 cities were lower than
28. 390 U.S. at 183.
29. 374 U.S. at 363.
30. See B. BOCK. MERGERS AND MARKETS 27 (6th ed. 1968).
31. 260 F. Supp. at 882. Competition in Nashville was "keen" but without "unusual
friction," an FDIC examiner reported in late 1963. Transcript, vol. 4, at 1332. The
"competitive atmosphere" was "intense," according to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Customers described Nashville as "the most competitive banking town they have ever
seen," a Third National vice-president in charge of business development testified. Transcript,
vol. 2, at 762. The district court agreed that business rivalry "has already been exceptionally
keen." Transcript, vol. I, at 124.
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Nashville. Third National, in turn, charged less than the Nashville
average. Before the merger, Nashville Bank had the lowest personal
checking account charges of any of the four largest banks. Since the
merger, charges had not been increased by the remaining banks?
2
B. Trust Activities
Chartered in 1889 as a trust company, Nashville Bank and Trust
Company added "Bank" to its title in 1956. Earning about one-quarter
of the total trust department revenues of all Davidson County banks in
the 1958-1963 period, it was more important in the trust business than
Third National. 3 Its trust department contributed 11.5 per cent of the
bank's total income, compared to 2.5 per cent for Third National 4
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve considered
Nashville Bank to be "a signficant alternative source of trust
services." Its trust department was "an aggressive competitor,"
according to the FDIC's Division of Examination, which viewed the
merger of "two important competitors in the trust field" as
eliminating "significant competition." 35 Nevertheless, the district
court estimated competition for trust business in Davidson County to
be "minimal." Judge Miller, contrary to the view generally accepted
by bankers, did not consider trust departments to be an important
lever in obtaining commercial business?
C. Nashville Bank's Local Correspondents
As a state chartered bank which did not belong to the Federal
Reserve System, Nashville Bank was required to keep legal reserves in
its own vaults or with depository banks. At the beginning of 1964, for
example, it had balances of 2.5 million dollars with First American,
1.0 to 1.5 million dollars with Third National and about .33 million
dollars with Commerce Union. The district court considered these
balances to be "a deterrent to competition by these banks.
3 7
Although banks usually do not compete with their
correspondents, the presidents of both Commerce Union and First
32. Transcript, vol. 3, at 1180; Post-trial Brief of the Intervenor at 35.
33. Id. at 959.
34. Id. at 1161.
35. Id. at 965.
36. 260 F. Supp. at 879 n.6. But see Ballam, The Trust Department, in THE BANKER'S
HANDBOOK 867, 882 (W. Baughn & C. Walker eds. 1966); Shelton, What a Good Trust
Department Means to the Bank as a Whole, 24 TRUST BULL. 10 (Oct. 1944).
37. Transcript, vol. 1, at 137.
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American testified that they were actively competing with Nashville
Bank." On the other hand, the president of Third National, as well as
the Comptroller of the Currency, insisted that the competition
between the merging banks was neither significant nor substantial."
D. Equalization as a Merger Benefit
Third National pointed out that the merger would bring it closer
in size to First American, which was one-sixth larger before the
merger, but roughly equal to Third National following it. The
increased equality, the defendants argued, would present a
countervailing power which would intensify competition. Such an
argument was set forth in the ManuJaturer's Hanover Trust Co.
case, decided by a district court, which reasoned that by narrowing
the previously existing gap between the third and fourth largest New
York City banks, the merger "improved the balance of the
competitive structure and intensified competition for the three
leaders.""
Sharp asymmetry among leading firms is thought by certain
students of industry to make for a higher degree of monopoly and
greater probability of collusion than if the leaders are co-equals.4' In
Nashville, the top two banks were not very far apart in size by 1964.
Moreover, during the period from 1955 to mid-1964 there had been a
trend toward greater equality. Against "the background of Nashville's
highly concentrated market and Third National's already great size,
the argument that merger would strengthen Third National in its
competition with First American should be received skepitcally42 As
the FDIC's Division of Examination stated "there is no evidence that
such equalization would outweigh the unfavorable factor of
elimination of substantial competition.' '1
E. Post-Merger Trends
Between the end of 1963 and the middle of 1968, assets in
Davidson County rose over 40 per cent and deposits increased 37 per
38. Transcript, vol. 2, at 240, 350.
39. Transcript, vol. I, at 148-49; Transcript, vol. 2, at 438.
40. United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 240 F. Supp. 867, 933 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
41. E. SINGER. ANTITRUST LCONOMICS: SELECTED LEGAL CASES AND ECONOMIC MODELS
125 (1968); Shepherd, On Appraising Evidence About Market Power. 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 68
(1967).
42. See generally J. BAIN. INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 575 (2d ed. 1968).
43. Transcript, vol. 3, at 957.
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cent. The two largest banks lost some of their market share despite
the merger, while the third bank gained. For the top three, asset
concentration remained steady at 98.1 per cent, while deposit
concentration declined slightly to 97.3 per cent 4 According to the
district court, competition subsequent to the merger "has been
extremely active and is greater than it was prior to the merger;
' 4 5
nevertheless, there was no significant alteration in the asset
concentration pattern. At the same time, there was no basis for the
Government's argument that the four smaller banks in Nashville had
been at an increasing disadvantage!' Unlike the situation in United
States v. First National Bank and Trust Co.,47 not one of the
Davidson County banks testified that the merger would impair its
ability to compete. In fact, the president of the newest bank explained,




Capital City Bank, which opened for business in Nashville in
March, 1960, had deposits of almost 7.5 million dollars by mid-1964.
Citing this experience, which was also noted by the district court,
Comptroller Saxon commented that "[t]here is hardly a monopoly
when a new bank can enter the market and prosper so remarkably in
such a short time." 49 Nonetheless, this was the first new bank to
open in Davidson County since 1927, when Third National was
chartered. As the Supreme Court pointed out, the newcomer's share
was only .9 per cent of the county's bank assets, and Capital City was
but one-fourth the size of Nashville Bank Significantly, Nashville
was not among the areas closed for new national bank applications in
the immediate future by a 1965 order of Comptroller Saxon, who
was anxious "to prevent overinvestment in banking in particular trade
areas." In June, 1966, he testified that the fact that no applicants had
appeared for a new charter to replace Nashville Bank indicated that
44. Transcript, vol. 1, at 140, 155.
45. Id.
46. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 496; letter from the Justice Department to the Comptroller of
the Currency, May 25, 1964.
47. 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
48. 260 F. Supp. at 81. See also Klebaner, The Lexington Merger Decision and its
Significance for Commercial Banking, I I ANTITRUST BULL. 911 (1966).
49. COMPTROLLER'S DECISION, supra note 13. at 131.
50. 390 U.S. at 191 n.24.
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the community felt that there was no need for another bank5
In another aspect of the entry situation, Nashville Bank argued
in its application for merger that "since practically all areas of the
county are already well-served with branches, and attractive locations
are almost prohibitively high in price, it would be very difficult to
enter into a branching program at this date. '5 2 The Antitrust Division
seized upon this argument as further evidence of oligopolistic power:
all but 2 of the 44 branches in the county in April, 1964, belonged
to the three largest banks. Later, inconsistently, the Justice Department
pointed to Capital City's two branches.53 Since the merger, Capital
City has added two more, and the other Nashville banks, seven.' In
December, 1968, the president of Third National was quoted as
saying that good branch locations were still available.
III. NASHVILLE BANK'S POSITION IN NASHVILLE
A. Conflicting Official Evaluations
The Tennessee Superintendent of Banking, who had jurisdiction
over Nashville Bank, agreed that it held "a minor position in the field
insofar as competition is concerned."" Comptroller Saxon likewise
testified that it "was not a major or effective competitor in
Nashville."5 Even more pointed was a statement of his successor,
William B. Camp, that Nashville Bank "could not, would not and
did not compete." 8 In contrast, the FDIC's Division of Examination
considered the four largest banks, which included Nashville Bank,
highly competitive, and reasoned that the merger would eliminate
"substantial competition." 9 Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors cited the elimination of direct competition between the
merging banks in its opinion on the competitive factors in the
merger. 0
51. Transcript, vol. 2, at 835; see 103 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP, 5
(1965-66).
52. Nashville Bank & Trust Application to Merge at 89.
53. Brief for United States at 29, United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for United States].
54. POLK'S WORLD BANK DIRECTORY (Sept. 1968).
55. The American Banker, Dec. 16, 1968, at 15.
56. Transcript, vol. 4, at 1195.
57. Id., Vol. 2 at 822.
58. See Appellee's Motion to Affirm at II, United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S.
171 (1968).
59. Transcript, vol. 3, at 957.
60. Id. at 965.
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According to the district court, Nashville Bank at the time of
merger was a "floundering, bank, though not a failing one . . . more
attuned to the Victorian age which gave it birth than to the
competitive realities of 20th Century commercial banking.""' Judge
Miller pointed to the slippage in its share of the banking business
from 5.7 per cent in mid-1960 to 4.8 per cent in mid-1964. While total
demand deposits in Davidson County rose almost 16 per cent,
Nashville Bank had the dubious distinction of being the only bank to
suffer a decline in the absolute dollar amount of demand deposits
from 19.98 to 18.95 million dollars . 2 Likewise, it was the only bank
in the market to show a decline in the percentage growth rate of
assets, loans and deposits in the four years after mid-1960 when
compared to the preceding four years.63 Moreover, in the brief period
before the crystallization of the merger agreement in March, 1964,
deposits in Nashville Bank declined by several million. 4
Although the Supreme Court noted that Nashville Bank was not
dynamic and its rate of growth was slower than other banks in the
county after 1960, the Court emphasized that "the absolute size of its
business increased steadily" up to the time of the merger; Nashville
Bank was "an important element in certain . . . facets of Nashville
banking," offering "somewhat different services, at somewhat
different rates, from those offered by the other banks .... "I'
B. Competition Between Third National and Nashville Bank
In the opinion of Comptroller Saxon, as well as that of the
district court, competition between the acquiring and acquired banks
was minimal, because of the difference in their size and diversity of
market interests.66 Yet a review of banking services offered by the two
institutions shows a preponderance of common activities. For
example, Nashville Bank offered nine of the fifteen deposit operations
found at Third National. As depositories, both were involved in the
same six distinct areas. 31 of 42 kinds of loans available from Third
National were available also at Nashville Bank. The smaller bank
performed only two of Third National's four safe deposit functions
61. 260 F. Supp. at 884.
62. Transcript, vol. 1, at 132.
63. Id. at 146.
64. Id. at 30-31. According to Comptroller Saxon, deposit shrinkage ($5.8 million
specified) was a factor prompting the merger. COMPTROLLER'S DECISION, supra note 13, at 130.
65. 390 U.S. at 183.
66. COMPTROLLER'S DECISION. supra note 13, at 130; Transcript, vol. I, at 137.
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and three of four investment services offered by the larger bank.
Of 32 various other services at Third National, Nashville Bank listed
19. Real estate sales and rentals were available at Nashville Bank,
but not from the larger bank." The size of customers' balances is
another significant measure of competitive overlap. At the end of
1963, 58 per cent of the dollar volume of demand deposits at Third
National and 70 per cent of Nashville Bank's deposits were in
accounts of over 50,000 dollars; the respective shares in time and sav-
ings accounts in the two banks were 19 and 21 per cent. 8
C. Correspondent Banking
A striking difference in the activities of the merging institutions is
found in the area of correspondent banking. Almost one-fifth of Third
National's deposits belonged to some 365 mid-southern
correspondent banks, while Nashville Bank, with only twelve inactive
accounts at the end of 1963, could hardly be said to be in this field."0
Third National, which stood in 108th place among all United States
banks with respect to total deposits and 58th in correspondent
balances, was clearly a substantial competitive factor in this area. 0
Offering no explanation for its position, the district court stated
that "a bank has the responsibility, if it has the assets and personnel,
to engage in correspondent banking."'" Existing competitors may
have adequately served the field, and it was not shown that Nashville
Bank's prospects here were more attractive than in other segments of
banking. While Judge Miller pointed out that Nashville Bank "could
have engaged in correspondent banking had it been truly
competitive," Comptroller Saxon testified that most banks the size of
Nashville Bank would not assume this activity.
D. Loan Policies and Loan Quality
The ratio of loans to deposits for Nashville Bank was well below
the Davidson County and United States averages from 1955 to 1964,
with the exception of 1958. During these years, Third National was
67. Transcript, vol. 3, at 987-91. Among important services not available from Nashville
Bank were: lock-box, night transit, payroll preparation, credit-by-check, term loan, statistical
information, and bank wire services. Transcript, vol. i, at 128-29.
68. Transcript, vol. 3 at 993.
69. COMPTROLLER'S DECISION, supra note 13, at 130.
70. 260 F. Supp. at 882.
71. Transcript, vol. I, at 127.
72. Trnscript, vol. 2, at 833.
[VOL. 22
THIRD NATIONAL BANK DECISION
above the average and generally outstripped First American as well
as Commerce Union in this respect.73 Commercial and industrial
loans averaged 26.7 per cent of Nashville Bank's total loan portfolio
during the period from 1961 through 1963, while Third National's
average was 40.8 per cent 4 However, if real estate loans for nonfarm,
nonresidential purposes are added to loans already classified as
commercial, Nashville Bank's ratio of loans for business purposes
becomes about one-third of its gross loans outstanding in these
years.
Both banks had similar proportions in loans to individuals for
personal expenditures. Nashville Bank advertised five per cent direct
new automobile loans and made none through dealers. The large
banks emphasized indirect car loans in their advertising, but they
made direct loans as well; indeed, Third National had twice as many
direct car loans as Nashville Bank at the time of the merger." The
proportion of real estate loans to total loans at Nashville Bank was
twice the state-wide average, while less than 1 1/4 per cent of Third
National's loans were in this form 7
The merger removed the only major alternative loan source
available to local businesses and individuals who could not or chose
not to deal with the three largest banks. At the end of 1963, 62 per
cent of the dollar volume of Nashville Bank's loans were in amounts un-
der 50,000 dollars, while Third National had only 52 per cent of its
loans under this amount. 8 Clearly, the presence of sizeable lesser banks
in a market has a favorable effect on smaller borrowers 9
The record of the merging banks in respect to the quality of
loans made was significantly different as reported by bank examiners
who evaluate questionable loans as being either substandard, doubtful,
or loss. A declining trend in the quality of loans had set in for
Nashville Bank in the early 1960's, as the district court noted. In
November, 1963, the dollar volume of its classified loans-those rated
substandard, doubtful, or loss-exceeded those so rated for Third
73. Nashville Bank's ratio was below average for all United States banks by at least 107r
in every year except 1957 and 1958. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, Loan-
Deposit Ratios (unpublished, available at Federal Reserve of New York).
74. Transcript, vol. 4, at 1256.
75. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 45-61, Schedule A.
76. Transcript, vol. 1, at 150.
77. COMPTROLLER'S DECISION, supra note 13, at 130.
78. Transcript, vol. 3, at 994.
79. J. GUTTENTAG & E. HERMAN, supra note 5, at 32; Carson & Cootner, supra note 10.
at 83.
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National, although the larger bank had an eightfold greater loan
volume.'0 As early as 1960, the FDIC examiner cautioned Nashville
Bank that its classified loans were sufficiently high to warrant
attention by officers and the board of directors. A disproportionate
amount of classified loans was noted the following year, though
overall the FDIC did not consider them unduly large.
As late as 1961, the agency continued to rate Nashville Bank's
management as satisfactory5 ' The FDIC lowered this rating to "fair"
in 1962; a rather large volume of loans was criticized, and the need
for closer screening of applications and a more aggressive servicing
and collection program were cited. Because of the large volume of
criticized loans, even though the number of such loans had decreased,
the "fair" rating was continued by the FDIC at the time of its late
1963 examination. Classified loans, 6.9 per cent of the total, were
below 1962's record 7.3 per cent, but sharply above the 3.6 per cent
for 1960 and 3.7 per cent for 1961.82 By the time of the 1963
examination, loss loans were cut to half of those of 1962, and overdue
paper had been reduced by one-fourth from the 1962 level of 1.2
million dollars." Net loan chargeoffs (.3 per cent in 1961, .4 per cent
in 1962, and .2 per cent in 1963) were not considered abnormally
high.P After the merger, Third National lost 121,000 dollars on the
23.6 million dollar loan portfolio acquired from Nashville Bank."
Altogether, the evidence would seem to indicate that 1962's loan
performance was particularly poor, while 1963's was somewhat more
encouraging.
E. Other Weaknesses
The FDIC rated the trust department of Nashville Bank only
"fair" during the years 1960 through 1963. Its 1960 report noted that
"the overall operations of the department leave much to be desired,"
and the 1963 report mentioned "lack of improvement in the long
80. Transcript, vol. I, at 152-53. The ratio of classified assets to total capital also
measures a bank condition. A third measure showed classified loans as 145.4% of Nashville
Bank's bad debt reserves, while Third National had only 17.2% at the end of 1963. Transcript,
vol. ],at 153.
81. Transcript, vol. 4, at 1264, 1295, 1299.
82. Id. at 1310, 1315, 1331, 1357.
83. Transcript, vol. 2. at 781, 785; Transcript. vol. 4, at 1357.
84. Transcript, vol. 2. at 786-87. Third National's ratio during these years was .24%, .24%,
and .23"/. Transcript, vol. 3, at 1156.
85. Transcript, vol. I, at 154; Transcript, vol. 3, at 933.
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standing criticisms. 86 The bank's equipment-similar to that
acquired 37 years earlier by Third National-was another example of
backwardness. In 1964 Nashville Bank was among fourteen medium-
sized Tennessee banks (most of the rest in very small communities)
which did not have any form of automated or computerized
equipment .8  Failure to set up and to develop branch banks was
another weakness. At the time of the merger only I of the 44
Davidson County branches belonged to Nashville Bank.88 Neglect of
this "hallmark of modern banking," in Comptroller Saxon's apt
phrase, certainly did not speak well of its policies. 9
In short, the district court correctly described management
policies as "unaggressive, ultra-conservative, negative and unpro-
gressive.""0 The Supreme Court recognized that "managerial de-
ficiencies" existed, but insisted on asking whether alternative solutions
were available." Before ruling on an anticompetitive bank merger, the
Supreme Court requires not only an examination of the condition of
the acquired bank but also an evaluation of the practicality of alterna-
tive remedial measures.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR NASHVILLE BANK'S PROBLEMS
A. Merger Negotiations
At the time negotiations were under way for the purchase of
Nashville Bank's controlling stock interest (held by the H. G. Hill
Company), Nashville Bank's President Hackworth did not tell the
Weaver group that it would be necessary for the bank to merge.
Weaver testified that he and his associates did not plan to sell or
merge Nashville Bank when they bought it. Serious discussions began
in November, 1963, and on January 13, 1964, the Weaver group
signed a contract to buy the H. G. Hill Company's stock in the
Nashville Bank. The purchase was consummated on March 11, 1964.
Six days earlier, after a series of discussions which had begun in mid-
February, Third National made a formal offer to buy the Weaver
group's controlling stock. Exactly one day elapsed between the time
86. Transcript, vol. 1, at 134-37.
87. Transcript, vol. 2, at 684.
88. 260 F. Supp. at 881 erroneously refers to 52 branches in the county.
89. COMIPTROLLER'S DECISION, supra note 13, at 131, quoted in 260 F. Supp. at 881.
90. 260 F. Supp. at 879, 881.
91. 390 U.S. at 190. The Supreme Court criticized the district court for not "'sufficiently
or reliably" establishing this point. The minority disagreed. 390 U.S. at 194.
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that the Weaver group delivered the cash for the Hill Company and
Hackworth stock, and the approval of the merger agreement by the
board of directors of both banks.12
Weaver was senior vice-president of the National Life and
Accident Insurance Company of Nashville and son-in-law of the
chairman of the board. His group viewed the stock purchase as an
investment and was unwilling or unable to participate in the active
management of the bank. They claimed not to have understood the
full magnitude of Nashville Bank's difficulties until after they had
entered into the agreement to buy itY3 However, the "many inquiries
by Weaver and his associates and attempts to find improved
management or otherwise solve these problems" referred to by the
appellees, and Weaver's testimony that they gave "a lot of thought
and consideration to the problem of management" appear to have
been appropriately characterized as perfunctory by the Justice
Department 4
The district court concurred in the argument that the merger was
a business necessity for the smaller bank.15 Negotiating another sale
would have been a "formidable task," while solving the bank's many
problems directly would have been an "even more formidable task."
Further, the district court stated that unless Nashville Bank merged, it
"faced an almost insoluble problem," which would require drastic
expenditures. 6 To put us in a position to evaluate properly the
rationale of the Supreme Court decision, possible remedial measures
must now be reviewed.
B. Management Difficulties
Nashville Bank's serious management problems-its inadequate
personnel and management policies and the "wholly inadequate"
salary scale-impressed the district court. For example, four of the
department heads were 65 or older and the other two were 59. Sixty was
the average age of the fifteen officers outside the trust department. Of
the three officers under 40, only one was a college graduate. President
Hackworth, 68, was ill and interested in retiring, but no one at the
bank was qualified to replace him. Judge Miller concluded that "it
92. Transcript, vol. 1, at 129-31; Transcript, vol. 2, at 487-88, 492, 527, 528, 536.
93. Transcript, vol. 2. at 492; Transcript, vol. I, at 145.
94. Brief for Appellee, Third Nat'l Bank, at 15, United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S.
171 (1968).
95. Id.
96. 260 F. Supp. at 881, 883.
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would have been practically impossible within any reasonable period
of time to obtain adequate managerial replacements either from
within the bank or from the outside. '9 7 Nevertheless, a government
witness, Professor McNichols, chairman of the Business
Administration Department of the Graduate School of Business at
Northwestern University, testified that the management "could
compare very favorably with other banks throughout the country."",
Also, the head of a Chicago bank personnel recruiting firm testified
that there would be no major problems in obtaining adequate new
management 9 Furthermore, both the number of officers and their
compensation were rated "satisfactory" on the FDIC examination of
November, 1963.00
Although the Supreme Court's statement that the "merger with
Third National would very probably end" Nashville Bank's
managerial problems appears unduly cautious, the Court correctly
asked whether "reasonable efforts to solve the management dilemma
of Nashville Bank short of merger with a major competitor" had
been tried but failed, or whether "any such efforts would have been
unlikely to succeed."'"' The weight of evidence appears to support the
Government's position that the Weaver group made no serious efforts
to resolve the management succession problem. The Supreme Court
took notice of the lower court's finding that the recruitment of new
management would be extremely difficult, considering the salaries paid
by Nashville Bank. To attract competent personnel, it is very likely
that salaries would have had to be raised. But if this were done, a
bank the size of Nashville Bank and located in a thriving, desirable
community would have difficulty demonstrating that it could not
recruit officer replacements. The problem then becomes one of
deciding whether realistic salary payments would have wiped out
prospective profits.
C. Would Revamping Nashville Bank Have Been Profitable?
Relying on figures supplied by Third National President Fleming,
the district court found that had Nashville Bank "made the
expenditures which needed to be made for the proper maintenance of
97. Id. at 880-81.
98. Transcript, vol. 2, at 880-81.
99. Id. at 912.
100. Id. at 792-93. Contra, Transcript, vol. 1, at 133.
101. 390 U.S. at 188-89.
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the bank, its apparently good earnings record in the years
immediately preceding the merger would have been substantially
diminished."' 02  The Antitrust Division exaggerated the bank's
profitability. Although the bank did have the highest increase in net
profits after taxes of any Davidson County bank in the period 1955
through 1963 (272 per cent), earnings were strikingly low in the initial
years of the comparison. Before 1960, the bank averaged 4.2 per cent,
which was less than half the return of all Sixth District member
banks, and well below the 7.8 per cent for all banks of comparable
size. Beginning in 1960, reported earnings compared favorably; while
the 1963 FDIC examination report found the Nashville Bank's earnings
to be satisfactory,' 3 at least some of the "profit" of the later years
reflected deferral of outlays for necessary improvements which could
not be postponed indefinitely.
According to Professor McNichols, the outlays for salary, fringe
benefits and remodeling would not have been imminent had the bank
remained independent. It is difficult to accept this viewpoint at least
as far as salaries are concerned. More to the point was his
observation that modernization outlays could be expected to enhance
the bank's profitability." 4 In the opinion of the FDIC, Nashville
Bank's growth in the period after 1960 (36.6 per cent in deposits)
"reflects neither stagnation nor lack of a considerable public
acceptance for an institution having but one branch in a city where
multiple branching by other major banks exists."" 3
D. Alternatives to Merger
According to the legislative history, the Bank Merger Act of
1966 had as one of its purposes the provision of more definite
guidelines for the floundering-bank problem in medium to small
communities.'0' The problem arises when there is a small number of
banks and one or more is stagnant due to its inability to attract top
management personnel because of its size, unrealistic and conservative
policies, or other reasons. At the time of the merger, both the
defendant banks and the district court considered the Nashville Bank
a "floundering bank."'0 7 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding none
102. Transcript, vol. 1, at 139.
103. Transcript, vol. 4, at 1331.
104. Transcript, vol. 2, at 901-03.
105. Transcript, vol. 3, at 957.
106. H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966).
107. 260 F. Supp. at 884.
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of the elements set forth by the House Committee on Banking and
Currency and noting the success of the much smaller Capital City
Bank, founded only a few years prior to the merger. The Court found
nothing to indicate that a 50 million dollar bank was too small to
attract top management; nor was there evidence that the new owners
were insisting on "unreasonably conservative managerial policies."'
Nashville Bank's rating with the FDIC had been downgraded to
"fair" in 1962, but the lower court did not draw any "conclusion
about the extent of the danger these conditions posed" for the bank's
future. Its 1963 net profit after taxes of 368,000 dollars and its
subsequent steady profitability impressed the Supreme Court.
Apparently the high court classified floundering banks as those in
danger of collapse or in a financially unstable condition; the district
court's findings had not documented "the possibility of eventual
failure of Nashville Bank."' °9
The Justice Department had previously posed the question to the
Supreme Court "whether a bank can be deemed to be floundering,
• . . so as to justify an anticompetitive merger, when the bank's
problems can evidently be resolved simply by an infusion of new
management or a limited amount of new capital."' 0 In oral argument
before the Supreme Court, the Government explained that unless
corrective measures were taken soon Nashville Bank would "tend to
go downhill and ultimately might even turn into a failing bank."
Nevertheless, the Government argued that the bank could not be said
to be floundering merely because it was "not operating efficiently and
using the most modern methods.""'
The Justice Department took the position that a substantially
anticompetitive merger should not be permitted in a floundering bank
situation unless defendants had shown "that they made reasonable
efforts to determine whether less anticompetitive solutions were
available." The Bank Merger Act was said to require exploration of
"all practicable alternatives to a highly anticompetitive merger."
Before Nashville Bank could merge with "a dominant and
substantial competitor," it should be required to show clearly "first,
that it has attempted to cure its problems without resort to merger,
and second, that it could not find a buyer with whom it did not
directly compete, or one of lesser size than the contemplated buyer."
108. 390 U.S. at 191-92 & n.24.
109. Id. at 187 & n.21.
110. Jurisdictional Statement, at 22, United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171
(1968).
III. Appellant's Oral Argument before the United States Supreme Court at 79, 8 1.
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If curing the problems without merger was feasible, "then resolution
of these problems at an unnecessarily high cost in terms of
competitive injury does not 'clearly outweigh' the merger's
anticompetitive effects.'112
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency had another
interpretation of the 1966 Act; regardless of the anticompetitive effect,
a merger clearly dictated by convenience and by needs of the
community should be approved. In such a view the possibility that a less
anticompetitive merger could have been arranged is irrelevant."
3
Along similar lines, Third National's attorneys reasoned that even
assuming that merger with the third-ranking bank would have been
less anticompetitive than merger with the second-ranking bank, the
former would not be the preferable alternative if the latter could be
shown to be more promotive of community needs.'
The Justice Department argued that if merger were the sole
solution, then a sale to Commerce Union, the third-ranking bank,
represented the lesser evil. Several times, starting in 1961, Commerce
Union's interest in acquiring Nashville Bank had been conveyed
informally to Hill and Hackworth. Subsequently, Commerce Union
offered the Weaver group about 360 dollars a share, but the Weaver
group wanted about 468 dollars."' The Justice Department argued
that the fact that a smaller profit would have accrued to the
shareholders from merger with Commerce Union was irrelevant. The
Officer of the Comptroller of the Currency objected to this approach,
saying that Commerce Union "was not interested in making a fair
price.'' -1
Neither court analyzed the possibility of a merger with
Commerce Union. Judge Miller was convinced that acquisition by
Third National satisfied the Merger Act's requirements. The Supreme
Court sought a preliminary demonstration that "alternative means
. ..without a merger would present unusually severe difficulties." '
The Court noted that such an alternative would have been an offer by
another businessman "to buy out the Weaver interest at an acceptable
price." 8
112. Brief for United States at 27 & 30.
113. Brief for Appellee, William B. Camp, at 24, 39.
114. Brief for Appellee, Third Nat'l Bank, at 55-56, United States v. Third Nat'l Bank,
390 U.S. 171 (1968).
115. Transcript, vol. 2, at 250-52.
116. Brief for United States at 30 & 31 n.18. Brief for Appellee, William B. Camp, at 36,
United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
117. 390 U.S. at 192.
118. 390 U.S. at 189.
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V. THE "NASHVILLE" DOCTRINE
The Bank Merger Act of 1966 precludes a merger which would
violate the Clayton Act "unless . . . the anticompetitive effects of the
proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by
the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and
needs of the community to be served.""' In United States v. First
City National Bank of Houston, the Supreme Court italicized
"clearly."'' 20 Then, in Nashville, it interpreted the statutory language
as requiring proof that the "merger was essential to secure this net
gain to the public interest. ' 12' Therefore, the defendant banks must
establish the unavailability of alternative solutions, because the Court
will declare the merger illegal if reasonably able businessmen could
have taken other remedial measures. 2 2 Thus in Nashville, one issue
was whether "more lively and efficient management" which would
continue to operate Nashville Bank as an independent entity could
have been secured. 23 Here the Court refused to sanction an
anticompetitive mefger unless there has been "a showing . . . that the
gain expected from the merger cannot reasonably be expected through
other means.' '1 24 Since there was no showing that lively and efficient
management could not be found by other means, the Supreme Court
held that the district court misapplied the "convenience and needs"
provision of the 1966 law. Thus, the Court will approve a merger "if
the gains in better service outweighed the anticompetitive detriment
and the merger was essential to secure this net gain to the public
interest."' 1 While the Court was prepared to give suitable weight to
benefits of a merger, it remanded the case for consideration of
alternative solutions.
VI. CONVENIENCE AND NEEDS ASPECT OF THE MERGER
A. Benefits of the Merger
In the lower court, Judge Miller found that the merger
contributed importantly to the area's needs and convenience by
119. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (Supp. 111, 1968).
120. 386 U.S. 361, 370 (1967).
121. 390 U.S. at 189.
122. Id. at 189-90.
123. Id. at 192.
124. Id. at 190.
125. Id. at 189.
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providing a greater loan limit, by solving Nashville Bank's problems,
and by providing better pay and fringe benefits for its former
employees. He also enumerated a great many benefits accruing to
customers formerly attached to Nashville Bank as a result of their
new connection with Third National. Every one of these advantages,
of course, had been available previously to those who did business
with any of the three largest banks. Third National, which described
itself as "a full service" bank, did not propose a single new service in
its merger application. '26
B. More and Larger Business Loans
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency considered Third
National's utilization of Nashville Bank's funds for commercial
lending to be the merger's most important benefit. The Supreme
Court agreed that the merger would "secure the better use of its
[Nashville Bank's] assets in the public interest."'2 The acquiring
bank, as we have seen, placed a greater emphasis on short-term
commercial lending. Moreover, because the capital base of the
combined institution generally exceeds that of the acquiring bank, a
merger ordinarily as in this case, increases the permissible maximum
size of loans.
In 1963, the Supreme Court rejected the defense that the
Philadelphia National Bank would be in a position to make much
larger loans, thereby allowing it to compete with New York banks.
This consideration was said to be irrelevant under the 1960 Bank
Merger Act: "If anticompetitive effects in one market could be
justified by procompetitive consequences in another .. . every firm
• . .could, without violating section 7, embark on a series of mergers
that would make it in the end as large as the industry leader. ' ' 28 In
Philadelphia the Court found that the lack of adequate banking
facilities caused no hardship to either individuals or businesses
because firms too large to be accomodated locally could obtain bank
credit elsewhere. In Nashville, however, the Supreme Court recognized
that one of the aims of the 1966 Merger Act was to give lending
capacity, a "factor, not previously relevant in appraising bank
mergers, suitable weight in judging their validity. 11 29
126. Intervenor's Exhibit No. I at 75, United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp.
869 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
127. 390 U.S. at 188-89.
128. 374 U.S. at 370.
129. 390 U.S. at 186.
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The district court found that the higher loan limit and Third
National's higher loan-to-deposits ratio enhanced the combined
institution's lending capacity. Since the district court did not spell out
the beneficial consequences of the enhanced lending capacity for the
Nashville community and did not define the value of these additions,
as compared with the less desirable results of the merger, the Supreme
Court felt that the increased lending capacity weighed very little in the
balancing test under the Merger Act. By this pronouncement, the
Supreme Court was presumably underscoring once again the principle
that alternatives to anticompetitive mergers must be sought first. As
for "beneficial consequences" the lower court pointed to the
dependence of small Nashville firms on local funds and reasoned that
a bank could best assist the growth of a developing area through
commercial loans. Further the court noted that Third National
disposed of some 8.4 million dollars of the Nashville Bank's real
estate mortgages and made the funds available for commercial lending
in Nashville and the central South. 30 For the district court to have
said any more on this subject would have been to labor the obvious.
Less clear-cut than the benefits of an increase in the funds for
shorter-term business lending are the advantages of a larger maximum
limit. Nashville's economic development created capital demands
which local and regional institutions could not satisfy. For example,
no bank in the Sixth Federal Reserve District was large enough to
meet the credit needs of any of the 14 giant corporations (among the
nation's 100 largest) with facilities in the District . 3' However, these
corporations, headquartered mostly in or near one of the largest cities,
do have ready access to major lenders anywhere in the United States
and their growth is not impeded by their having to look to distant
centers for their funds. Some of Third National's lines of credit,
moreover, were extended to such firms as General Motors, General
Motors Acceptance Corporation, S.ears Roebuck, and Ralston-
Purina.3 2 Only 1 of the 500 largest industrial firms in the nation,
130. Transcript, vol. 1, at 155. Funds totaling $11.2 million became available from the
sale of mortgages and Third National's higher loan-deposit policy. Id. The merger added
altogether $12.7 million in commercial lending power. Brief for Appellee, William B. Camp, at 91.
131. Transcript, vol. 1, at 143; ef. 390 U.S. at 186.
132. Transcript, vol. 3, at 1067-69. Altogether, Third National made 21 loans in excess of
$700,000 between January, 1963, and August 17, 1964, to out-of-state borrowers. Id. at 1074-78.
The combined lending limit of all banks it/ the nation with deposits of over $100 million is
under $2.2 billion. GMAC borrows about $3 billion at short term from banks and the
commercial paper market. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Business Conditions at 5 (Dec.
1968).
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Genesco, makes its headquarters in Nashville. 3 3 Surely it did not face
difficulties in securing whatever financing it sought outside the Sixth
District.
Actually, a very large local firm (for example, Capitol Airways,
or Murray-Ohio Manufacturing) could have secured a larger total
credit before the merger, if both banks involved had participated in
the loan. Nashville Bank had an unconditional limit of 654,000
dollars and a conditional limit of 1,090,000 dollars. The smaller
amount was almost one-fourth more than the increase gained by
Third National as a result of the merger.'34 Loan participations are
common when a bank is unable or unwilling to assume the full
responsibility of accommodating a large customer. For example,
Nashville Bank had participated to the extent of 1 million dollars in a
19.6 million dollar credit to Genesco. Third National also had a large
interest in this loan arrangement, which was handled by First
American.'3
Undoubtedly, as Comptroller Saxon stated, merger would enable
Third National "better . . . to meet the credit needs of its larger
customers throughout the Nashville wholesale trade area."'3 Yet the
Comptroller testified after the merger that Nashville did "not yet
possess an institution of sufficient size to meet even the existing
capital requirements of the larger business institutions, and indeed has
to rely excessively on outside institutions." He also believed that
Nashville was a capital deficit area which needed a reasonable
concentration of banking resources to provide for its growing needs.
137
Again in 1966 he referred to Nashville's need "to reduce . . . an
excessive reliance on outside institutions.' ' 38 Just how larger banks
can eliminate the deficit is nowhere made clear. A capital deficit area
will inevitably import capital, but to speak of the resulting drain of
earnings with negative overtones is to overlook the benefit to the area,
whose growth is made possible in part by financing from sources
outside the region. As for accomodating the large customers, there is
no reason for additional entrants to make this borrower market more
competitive than it already is. 39
133. 70 FORTUNE, July 1964, at 179.
134. Transcript, vol. 1, at 129.
135. Transcript, vol. 3, at 1070; cf. Transcript, vol. 2, at 187.
136. CO.I.'TROLLER'S DECISION, supra note 13, at 131.
137. Transcript, ol. 2. at 820, 835.
138. Id.
139. Alhadeff, Bank Mergers, 29 So. ECON. J. 218, 220 (1963).
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A recent study of mergers in the Sixth Federal Reserve District
suggested that service benefits to the public, such as larger loan limits
and increased or new services, "probably outweighed, in most cases,
the presumed inconvenience . . . to the public of reductions in numbers
of alternative sources of banking services." 4 " Realistically, the Antitrust
Division cannot afford to ignore the advantages to a community
which a larger institution, made possible only by merger, would bring
about. But before an anticompetitive merger is condoned, it is not
unreasonable on the Division's part to insist on a more persuasive
showing of convenience and needs than was made in the Nashville
case.
VII. BANK MERGER POLICY AFTER Nashville
A. Convenience and Needs, and Floundering Banks
As the Supreme Court recognized, the 1966 law provided
merging banks with a new defense or justification: "an
anticompetitive bank merger would be in the public interest because of
the benefits it would bring to the convenience and needs of the
community to be served."'' However, the banks have the burden of
demonstrating the unavailability of alternative means of securing these
benefits. "Otherwise," the Supreme Court pointed out, "the benefits
of competition, acknowledged by Congress, would be sacrificed
needlessly."'4 The unnecessary elimination of a competitor can hardly
be said to contribute to the community's convenience and needs.
Unless the authorities administering the 1966 Act apply a rigid
standard for outweighing anticompetitive effects, they are in danger of
sanctioning merger proposals which injure competition needlessly.
After all, if merger is a readily available solution, the incentive to
pursue more difficult alternatives which preserve or enhance
competition is greatly weakened.'43 Nashville Bank, according to
140. Crum, Evaluation of Some Concentration Influences in the Postwar Banking
Structure of the Southeastern Region Comprising the Sixth Federal Reserve District, I So. J.
Bus. 249 (1966).
141. 390 U.S. at 192.
142. 390 U.S. at 189; see Hearings on S. 1698 BeJore the Subcomnm. on Amendment to
the Bank Merger Act of the Senate C(onnt. on Banking & (urrencY, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1,
at 378 (1965) (Federal Reserve Governor Mitchell) [hereinafter cited as 1698 hearings].
143. Via, Antitrust and the Amended Bank Merger and Holding (ompanY Acts, 53 \'A.
L. Ri-v. I115, 1131 (1967). See also Alhadeff, supra note 139, at 228: Edwards, Bank Mergers
and the Public Interest: A Legal and Economic Analysis oJ the 1966 Bank Merger Act, 85
BANKING L.J. 753, 790-91 (1968).
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Comptroller Saxon, was "not disposed to compete."'' But the profit
awaiting the Weaver group from sale of their stock interest to Third
National could hardly strengthen their disposition. What if merger
were ruled out?
The evaluation of a convenience and needs defense is not a simple
matter. Federal Reserve Governor Mitchell has suggested that surveys
of community views, informed judgments of bank examiners, and a
review of the bank's participation in financing its community show
the area's demands for various banking services, as distinct from the
services that the existing and proposed banks intend to supply"
Though difficult to gauge, the benefits which a merger may bring to
a community are rightly a matter which the applicant banks may now
argue with the authorities.
B. Problem Situations
Management problems, especially those revolving around
succession, are perhaps the most common argument offered for
mergers. This is not a recent development. State and federal
supervisors over a dozen years ago cited successor management as
"the biggest problem and most glaring weakness of bank
management."'46
In "determining whether the merging bank is capable of
obtaining its own improved management," the Supreme Court does
not "demand the impossible or the unreasonable."' 7 The Supreme
Court's search for feasible alternatives to merger also reflects the
thinking of the House Committee on Banking and Currency on the
earlier Bank Merger Act. In 1960, the Committee enumerated a
number of situations where merger would be in the public interest
(and lawful), despite the fact that competition might be lessened
substantially:
144. 260 F. Supp. at 881. A bank which finds merger blocked, however, is more likely to
develop or discover a disposition to compete.
145. Gustus, Mergers, Branches, and Convenience and Needs, FED. RES. BANK OF PtILA.
Bus. REV. at 16 (Nov. 1968); cf. 1698 Hearings, supra note 142, at 377.
146. Bowers, Management Succession in Bank Mergers, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA. Bus.
REV. at 18, 22 (Nov. 1968); H. LIVINGSTON, MANAGEMENT POLICIES IN AIERICAN BANKS 100
(1956); Alhadeff concluded that "management problems . . . were not a major initiating
factor" in mergers. Alhadeff, Recent Bank Mergers, 69 QUAR J. ECON. 506 (1955). A 1964
investigation suggested that more commonly the succession problem was brought about by a
desire to merge rather than the reverse. AN EVALUATION OF THE MANAGEMENT SUCCESSION
PROBLEM IN THE COMMERCIAL BANKING INDUSTRY, SUBCOMNM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF TIlE
HOUSE COMm. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1964).
147. 390 U.S. at 190. See also Edwards, supra note 143, at 794-95.
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(1) ultimate failure is a "reasonable probability;"
(2) management problems can be corrected "only by a merger
with the resulting bank;"
(3) "a problem bank with inadequate capital or unsound assets
and the merger is the only practicable means of solving the problem;"
(4) overbanking in a small town results in "resort to unsound
competitive practices, which may eventually have an adverse effect on
the condition of such banks, and the merger would correct this
situation.' '1
Thus, the attitude reflected in this report permeates the Supreme
Court's reading of the 1966 Act in the Nashville case. Although the
language of the 1966 statute differs from the 1960 law, it certainly
cannot be argued that the later measure was intended to downgrade
the element of competition as a criterion.
The Antitrust Division's "restrictive interpretation of the 1966
Amendment" was the subject of adverse comment by the district
court. 4 ' When the convenience and needs provision was under
consideration by the Congress, the Attorney-General criticized it as an
unnecessary, inappropriate "substantive change in existing law."
Despite opposition, it was enacted. The report of the House
Committee on Banking and Currency explained that although section
7 of the Clayton Act applies to banks, the 1966 amendment "permits
an exception in cases where it is clearly shown that a given merger is
so beneficial to the convenience and needs of the community to be
served . . . that it would be in the public interest to permit it." '
There can be no doubt that Congress intended that the
convenience and need exception should apply to the "floundering
bank" problem. Other situations to which the exception applies are
less obvious from the record. The Government argued in both
Houston and Nashville that the amendment would apply where "new
and important banking services" would be brought to the community.
It then contended that the Nashville Bank merger failed to provide
such service. 5
The scope of convenience and needs should be left undefined.
Certainly the Nashville case has not established any restrictions on the
kinds of benefits which might appropriately be embraced under the
exception. Rather, as the Supreme Court perceived:
148. H.R. REp. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1960).
149. 260 F. Supp. at 875.
150. H.R. REp. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, 7 (1966).
151. Brief for United States at 31-32.
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The necessity of choosing is most clearly posed where the proposed merger would
create an institution with capabilities for serving the public interest not possessed
by either of the two merging institutions alone and where the potential could be
realized only through merger.'
The banks are only required to show the importance of the benefits
and their inherent connection with the merger in question; to insist in
addition that the benefits be new or different would be gratuitously
restrictive. As the then Economist to the Comptroller of the Currency
wrote in 1963: "[I]t is in the public interest to be discriminating
enough to allow concentration where it is beneficial and to forbid it
where it is harmful.'
'53
C. Concentration Ratios and Bank Mergers
Convinced that "the test is fully consonant with economic
theory," the Supreme Court in Philadelphia saw in the market
concentration data an approach which "lightens the burden of
proving illegality . ..with respect to mergers whose size makes them
inherently suspect in light of Congress' design in section 7 to prevent
undue concentration."'5 4 Economists commenting on the Philadelphia
decision pointed out that at issue was the complex question, yet
unresolved by their profession, "of the competitive impact of a change
in concentration in a market already characterized by a substantial
degree of concentration."' 55 Economic theory has little to offer in the
form of well-grounded analysis of the consequences for competition
when an already oligopolistic market setting, such as is common in
banking, loses a firm.' The reduction in the number of firms does
152. 390 U.S. at 185-86. A thoughtful decision, handed down a few weeks before
.Vashville, interpreted convenience and needs as "a narrow and restricted exception." The
condition to which it would apply in the case of an anticompetitive merger is described as
"compelling" in two different places. United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 280 F. Supp. I, 23-
25 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
.153. Abramson, Private Competition and Public Regulation, in STUDIES IN BANKING
COMPITITION AND TIE BANKING STRUCTURL 18 (1966) [hereinafter cited as STLDIIS]. For
economic arguments in favor of the Supreme Court's approach, see Edwards, supra note 143 at
794-95. His statement, that "neither the convenience and the needs defenses nor the floundering
bank defense prove to be supportable in cases where the merger violates the competitive
standards of Section 7," appears premature to say the least. Id. at 795.
154. 374 U.S. at 363.
155. Motter, Bank Mergers and Public Policy. in STUDIES, supra note 153. at 10- see G.
FISCHER, AMERICAN BANKING STRUCTURE 363-64 (1968). Even a supporter of Philadelphia, like
Edward Herman, makes this point. Herman, The Philadelphia Bank Merger Decision and Its
Critics, in STUDIES, supra note 153, at 51-52 (1966).
156. F2. SINGER, supra note 41, at 131-32: see G. FISCHER. supra note 155, at 368:
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not necessarily lessen the intensity of competition . 57 The idea "that
market power or the plane of competition can be inferred directly and
exclusively from data relating to the structure of the market" is a
"main misconception" according to Professor Edward Mason, an
outstanding authority, who has warned that "'a study of structure is
not enough.'' Scholars have rejected the notion that concentration
ratios by themselves can tell us what kind of behavior will be found in
. a banking market. 5 Most economists would agree with Carl Kaysen
that "market share statistics can do no more than raise the question"
of monopoly. Determination of the degree of competition in a locality
calls for an appraisal of the banks involved.' In Nashville, Justice
Harlan agreed and reiterated his criticism of his colleagues who
adopted "the 'numbers game' test for determining Clayton Act
violations." He found the market concentration test particularly
inappropriate for banking."'
In 1966 Congress once again refused to adopt a Clayton Act test
simpliciter for bank mergers. At least for acquisitions in the banking
industry, a narrow structural approach is inappropriate. The
application to banking of the guidelines announced several months
after Nashville by the Justice Department would block most mergers.
In unregulated industries, a merger attempt by two companies, each
holding four per cent of the market in an industry where the top four had
75 per cent or more, would be challenged." 2 Under the 1966 Act,
however, high concentration in a banking market does not
automatically preclude merger, nor should it. Nevertheless the
Supreme Court agreed with the Justice Department's argument that
the 1966 Act had not altered the test for the threshold determination
Markham, (urrent Decisions in Antitrust, NAT'L INDUS. CONFERENCE BD. 6TH CONFERENCE ON
ANTITRUST 4. 7 (1967).
157. E. SINGER, supra note 41, at 131.
158. Mason, Preface to C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER. ANTITRUST POLICY xviii (1959).
Structure includes not only concentration, but also such factors as conditions of entry of new
firms and product differentiation.
159. Alhadeff, supra note 139, at 218, 219; Carson & Cootner, supra note 10, at 84;
Carson & Horvitz, Concentration Ratios and Competition, in STUDIES, supra note 153, at 19-20,
24.
160. Kaysen, The Present War on Bigness, NAT'L INDUS. CONFERENCE BD. 4TII
CONFERENCE ON ANTITRUST 31, 34 (1965); see Smith, Measures of Banking Structure and
Competition, 51 FED. RES. BULL. 1212, 1221 (1965); cJ. Handler, Some Misadventure in
.Antitrust Policy Making, 76 YALE L.J. 92. 103 (1966).
161. 390 U.S. at 193.
162. MERGER GUIDELINES, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RELEASE, at 9 (May 30, 1968);
American Banker, May 31, 1968, at I.
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of whether the challenged merger is substantially anticompetitive. The
Philadelphia approach, with its stress on market percentages as
normally the most important index to a merger's competitive effects,
will therefore continue to be used.
D. Line of Commerce Considerations
The Supreme Court has rightly pointed out that although other
institutions compete with commercial banks, at least with respect to
checking accounts they are unique, and for other than large firms,
banks have little effective competition in the area of short-term
loans. 16 3 The Justice Department has emphasized this view. 16 4 In
passing on mergers, however, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency has considered "the presence and behavior of other financial
institutions."'65 Likewise, under the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956, the FDIC has considered competition from non-bank sources, as
has the Board of Governors. 6 '
There is some basis for the argument that Congress intended that
non-bank competition should be considered in a merger situation. 7
The 1966 Bank Merger Act, unlike the 1960 Act, used section 7
Clayton Act language but omitted "in any line of commerce." In
Houston, the Justice Department argued that this omission was
"inadvertent" and "of no particular consequence," and it reiterated
this viewpoint in the Nashville proceeding.' On the other side of the
question, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reasoned that
the omission was deliberate and that the amendment provided for a
broader product market than allowed in the Philadelphia decision. 6 '
163. 374 U.S. at 327. 356 n.33. For a critique of the Justice Department's
position, see 1698 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 142, at 785. For a critique of the line of
commerce argument, see Note, The 1966 Amendment to the Bank Merger Act, 66 Cot.uM, L.
REV. 764, 781, 785 (1966).
164. 1698 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 142, at 725 (testimony of Governor Mitchell &
Comptroller Saxon).
165. Id. at 785 (testimony of the Comptroller of the Currency). For an economic
argument by the staff of the Comptroller, see STUDIES, supra note 153, at 22-23.
166. 1698 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 142, at 804; Hearings on S. 2353, S. 2418 and H.R.
7371 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, at 701 (1966). The Board of Governor's position represents a shift from an earlier
stand. Klebaner, Federal Control of Commercial Bank Mergers, 37 IND. L.J. 287, 304 (1962).
167. 106 CONG. REC. 9713 (1960).
168. Brief for the United States at 20 n.12.
169. Brief for Appellee, William B. Camp, at 52, United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390
U.S. 171 (1968); Pronouncements by Senator Robertson (D-Va.) supported this reading. 112
CONG. REC. 2655 (1966).
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The 1966 statute refers to "the business of banking" in
prohibiting bank mergers which would violate section 2 of the
Sherman Act, but the very next section, which uses phrases from
section 7 of the Clayton Act, does not so specify. 70 On the other
hand, justification for a restrictive (Philadelphia) interpretation of line
of commerce can be found in a comparison of the Ashley Report,
issued by a "rump" House Banking Committee,' 7' and the final
Patman Report of the full committee. 72 The later report had many
sections taken verbatim from the Ashley Report, but omitted precis6
language reflecting the expectation that the authorities would take
into consideration the fact that commercial banks face intensive
competition from other financial institutions.
Rejecting defendant banks' argument, the district court in
Nashville confined the line of commerce to commercial banking. This
was not at issue in the appeal, but the Supreme Court found that the
1966 Amendment was not intended "to alter the traditional methods
of defining relevant markets in which to appraise the anticompetitive
'"173effect of a merger....
Whatever one's interpretation of the complex issue of
congressional intent, the fact remains that in most of their activities
commercial banks compete with other financial institutions. Of course
such competition does not eliminate the necessity for inter-bank
rivalry. 74 Small demand depositors are effectively confined to a
narrow geographic area, and small business borrowers are essentially
restricted to local commercial banks for low-cost loans. For these
groups, a bank merger is likely to have the greatest adverse impact,
thus making the narrow line of commerce most appropriate.
Nevertheless, there are situations where a reasonable evaluation of
the impact of a merger on competition can be made only if the line of
commerce includes other financial institutions besides commercial
banks.75 If meaningless market share statistics are to be avoided, the
product market cannot arbitrarily be confined to commercial banking
in every case.
170. 12 U.S.C. § 18(c)(5) (1964).
171. H.R. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965).
172. H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1966).
173. 390 U.S. at 182 n.15; Brief for United States at 20-21.
174. P. Smith, Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Pennsylvania, May 25, 1965, at
x, 61 (unpublished study prepared for use by the Pennsylvania Banking Law Commission); 1698
Hearings, pt. I, supra note 142, at 378-79 (testimony of Governor Mitchell).
175. G. FISCHER, supra note 155 at 345; Shull, Commercial Banking as a "Line of
Cominerce," in STUDIES, supra note 153, at 94, 95 (1966); cf. Edwards, supra note 143, at 770.
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E. Insistence ofAlternatives
The Supreme Court suggested in Houston that the convenience
and needs of the community approach, referred to in the 1966 Act,
and the failing-company doctrine were related, though perhaps
remotely .17  The failing-company doctrine, with its long standing in
antitrust law, calls not only for evidence of the acquired firm's
debilitated condition, but probably also for the seeking out of less
anticompetitive alternatives. Thus the recent Justice Department
"Merger Guidelines" insist that good faith efforts to find a partner
be consistent with the purposes of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 77 A
fortiori, where at the time of merger the firm to be acquired is a more
substantial competitor than would be a failing company, sound public
policy requires that realistic alternative solutions be explored.
In this respect, Nashville may have simplified the application of
the standards of the Bank Merger Act.178 If there is a practicable
alternative to an anticompetitive merger which keeps the bank alive,
there will be no occasion for weighing imponderables. If merger is the
only plausible solution, then weighing may enter the picture as various
possible combinations are explored.
It should be noted that the more restrictive a state's branching
laws, the more difficult it is to avoid an anticompetitive merger. Had
merger proven to be the only way out for Nashville Bank, then the
authorities would have had to decide between Third National and
Commerce Union. Consideration would have had to be given to the
adverse effects on competition, versus the prospective advantages to
the community which each prospective partner would be in a position
to offer as an enlarged institution. Statewide merger possibilities offer
greater chances of minimizing competitive injury.
F. The Antitrust Division's Role
Under the Bank Merger Act, the agency whose approval is
needed must request an opinion on competitive factors from the other
two federal banking agencies, as well as from the Attorney General.
In connection with the proposed acquisition of Nashville Bank, the
176. 386 U.S. at 369.
177. II ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 76 (1968).
178. The difficulty of applying the standards of the 1960 Bank Merger Act was once
suggested by Federal Reserve Governor Robertson: "Suppose it is concluded that the merger
would lessen competition. 'but it is hard to say how much'-then go on and weigh this
imponderable against the benefits you guess may flow from the merger-to both the public and
the banks." 1698 Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 142, at 2005.
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Comptroller of the Currency received adverse reports from all three
sources. Both the Board of Governors and the FDIC found that the
merger would adverseiy affect competition 79 while the Justice
Department filed suit to oppose it.s °
The purpose of the advisory opinions on competitive factors is to
foster uniform standards. In the period from the beginning of 1966
through July, 1968, the Board of Governors found a serious
anticompetitive effect in 94 cases before the other two agencies, while the
Comptroller and the FDIC issued denials in only three. Thus each agen-
cy appears to handle a case in a significantly different manner. This
situation persists after eight years of experience and is likely to
continue as long as responsibility for bank supervision is divided
among three federal agencies.
The Nashville doctrine suggests the need for bank supervisory
agencies and the Justice Department to think about structural
possibilities in a banking market which extend beyond the
rearrangement proposed by the merger application. Any effort to
improve the banking structure in specific markets in the long run
faces major obstacles. New banks can obtain either a state or a
federal charter, while merger and branching decisions are made by
three federal agencies acting separately. The pattern of divided
jurisdiction plus the fact that initiative for change rests with the
banks, all but rule out any coordination of structural plans. Whatever
fundamental unity of purpose is ultimately achieved under existing
arrangments must rest on the Justice Department's power to file anti-
merger suits; in 1968, 10 of its 24 merger challenges involved banks.81
Once a complaint is filed, the merger is ordinarily delayed until
the banks win their case. Houston made it clear that injunction would
be the rule under the 1966 law: "[A]bsent a frivolous complaint by
the United States, which we presume will be infrequent, a stay is
essential until the judicial remedies have been exhausted."'782
179. 390 U.S. at 179; letter from FDIC to ATmes J. Saxon, May 28, 1964, Transcript,
vol. 3, at 957 (FDIC Division of Examination).
180. COMPTROLLER'S DECIsION, supra note 13, at 132.
181. Department of Justice Release (Jan. 9, 1969). Three of the ten bank mergers were
cancelled.
182. 386 U.S. at 370. For a criticism of the injunction as "an instrument of oppression,"
see interview with Eugene J. Metzger, formerly with the office of the Comptroller of the
Currency and earlier with the Department of Justice. 60 BANKING 46 (April, 1968).
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G. The Consent Decree
Rather than continue the litigation, Third National, busy with
plans to combine with National Life and Accident Insurance
Company in a one-bank holding company, entered into a consent
decree in October, 1968.'1 Under its terms, a new FDIC-insured state
bank, The Nashville Bank and Trust Company, with total capital of
4.18 million dollars, opened for business on December 16, 1968, in the
building (remodelled by Third National) which had served as
headquarters for the old Nashville Bank. The new bank started out
with two branches: one had belonged to the old Nashville Bank; the
other had always been part of Third National. Some 33 million
dollars in deposits at the three locations were transferred to the new
bank, whose capital can support a considerably larger total.
President Howell, of the spun-off bank, had been a credit officer
for most of his 36 years at Third National. Of the staff of eight
officers, several had been with the old Nashville Bank and stayed on
with Third National after the merger.' Under the consent decree,
Third National was allowed to retain all of the trust business acquired
from the old Nashville Bank. Though only 114th in total deposits
nationally, Third National stood 98th in trust income, and 103rd in
trust assets in 1967.185
The Bank Merger Act of 1966 forgave all bank mergers
previously unchallenged by the Justice Department, as well as two
prosecuted combinations- Manufacturers Hanover Bank in New
York and First Security National Bank in Lexington, Kentucky. This
left three contested post-Philadelphia mergers for the courts to decide.
Crocker-Citizens in California won in the district court, and the
Government did iot appeal. 8  Mercantile Trust of St. Louis, after the
Supreme Court remanded in accordance with Houston, agreed to
establish a new bank on the downtown site of the old Security Trust
headquarters. 7 The settlement of the last of this series of actions
restored "an important banking alternative" to Nashville.'88
183. American Banker, Dec. 2, 1968, at 1. The Veaver group is connected with this
insurance company.
184. FDIC Press Release No. 65-68; American Banker, Dec. 16, 1968, at 1. On the eve of
the merger in August 1964, the old Nashville Bank had $42.5 million in deposits and $4.7
million in capital. Transcript, vol. 3, at 933.
185. American Banker, June 18, 1968, at 9; Id., July 12, 1968, at 22.
186. United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank; 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
187. United States v. Mercantile Trust Co., 263 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Mo. 1966), rev'd &
remanded, 389 U.S. 27 (1967) (per curiam).
188. American Banker, Mar. 5, 1968, at I; Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 75.
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From Houston and Nashville, the Antitrust Division emerged
with important powers to affect the banking structure of the United
States. How wisely this authority under the 1966 Act will be used by
the Justice Department is a matter of concern to the Congress and the
public.

